Iran and Israel War Live update 2025-26

[zaasmi]

Key Military & Strike Updates Today

Ongoing airstrikes: Israel and the U.S. continued heavy bombardment of targets in Tehran and across Iran, including what Israeli forces called strikes on the “heart of Tehran.” Reports mention additional broad waves hitting military sites, with over 2,000 targets struck since the start (Feb 28). Iran reports attacks on more than 130 cities.
Iranian retaliation: Iran and its allies (including Hezbollah) launched missile and drone strikes on Israel, U.S. assets in the Gulf (e.g., Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar energy sites), and reportedly hit areas near the U.S. Embassy compound in Kuwait. Explosions reported in Dubai, Doha, Manama, and other Gulf cities.
Casualties rising:
Iran: Iranian Red Crescent reports over 555 deaths (civilian and military) from strikes.
Israel: At least 11 killed, plus 31 in Lebanon from related Hezbollah exchanges.
U.S.: 4 service members confirmed killed (up from earlier reports), plus injuries. A “friendly fire” incident in Kuwait saw three U.S. F-15 jets shot down by Kuwaiti forces—crews ejected safely.

U.S. posture: President Trump addressed the nation (White House event and interviews), saying the campaign is “substantially ahead” of schedule but could last 4-5 weeks or “far longer.” He outlined four main goals: destroy Iran’s missile/naval capabilities, prevent nuclear weapon acquisition, and stop regime support for proxy groups. He declined to rule out U.S. ground troops if “necessary” and said more forces are deploying to the region. Trump called it the “last best chance” to neutralize threats.
Regional spillover: Hezbollah active in Lebanon; strikes exchanged there. Gulf airspace disruptions continue, oil tankers hit near Strait of Hormuz (20% of global oil flow at risk).

Economic & Market Impacts
Oil prices surged (U.S. crude +7%, Brent near $79/barrel) due to supply fears. Global stocks dropped (e.g., Europe down 1-2.5%), with flight to safe havens like gold (+1.5%) and the U.S. dollar.
Cyber Front (Including Pakistan Angle)

Cyber operations ramped up alongside physical strikes.
Pro-Western/Israeli-linked hacks targeted Iranian apps (e.g., popular prayer app BadeSaba flooded with anti-regime messages urging defection), news sites, banks, and infrastructure. Internet outages hit parts of Iran.
Iranian/pro-Iran groups retaliated with intrusions into U.S./Israeli systems and possible DDoS. No major new Pakistan-specific incidents reported today (earlier hacks on media like ARY/Geo were noted, but quiet now). Broader alerts for infrastructure in the region.

WW3 Fears & Broader Context

No direct entry from Russia, China, or North Korea yet, though Russia stated it’s in “constant contact” with Iran’s leadership.
Social media full of escalation talk, but no official WW3 declaration. Experts see it as still primarily regional, though risks of wider involvement (e.g., NATO allies, proxies) remain high.
Khamenei confirmed killed in initial strikes; Iran setting up a temporary leadership council (process underway, possibly complete in days).

What to Watch in the Next 24-48 Hours

Potential “big wave” of larger U.S./Israeli strikes (Trump hinted at this).
Iranian counter-responses, especially missiles targeting Gulf/U.S. bases or Israel.
Diplomatic moves? Trump mentioned talks could be “easier” now, but Iran vows defiance and revenge—no ceasefire signals.
Cyber spikes or infrastructure disruptions (power grids, internet in affected areas).
Oil/economic shocks if Strait of Hormuz worsens.

For Lahore/Pakistan: No direct military involvement, but stay alert for cyber threats (update devices, avoid suspicious links), potential energy price hikes, and misinformation online. Monitor PTA/CERT alerts if media/internet issues arise.

[Mohib Ullah]

Key Points from Today (March 2, 2026)

• NATO’s position on the Iran conflict: Secretary General Mark Rutte explicitly praised the US-Israeli actions against Iran but stressed that NATO as an alliance will not get involved militarily. This came in a Brussels press conference today—NATO sees this as outside its core Article 5 scope (collective defense in Europe/North America) and isn’t activating any response. Some allies (like Spain) have already blocked use of their bases for strikes on Iran.
• China’s stance: Beijing condemned the US/Israeli strikes strongly (calling them a violation of sovereignty and international law), said it wasn’t given any prior notice by Washington, and urged an immediate end to hostilities. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning reiterated calls for de-escalation. China coordinated with Russia (e.g., Lavrov-Wang Yi call on March 1 condemning the strikes and pushing for diplomacy). No military moves announced—China is positioning as a diplomatic stabilizer, not escalating.
• No NATO-China joint/conflict announcement: Nothing official from NATO targeting China or vice versa in the last 24-48 hours. Broader NATO-China tensions exist (e.g., Arctic cooperation between Russia/China concerns NATO, ongoing rhetoric about China’s support for Russia in Ukraine), but these predate the current crisis and aren’t triggering new declarations now.
• Speculation and social media buzz: Some X discussions speculate this Iran conflict is indirectly “about stopping China” (e.g., by disrupting alliances or oil flows), or that Europe/NATO’s non-involvement signals weakness if a bigger China conflict arises. Others worry about escalation pulling in Russia/China proxies. But these are opinions—not backed by any official upcoming announcement.

What to Expect in the Coming Days

• No credible reports of an imminent NATO-China “conflict announcement.” The focus remains on the Middle East: more US/Israeli strikes possible, Iranian responses, and diplomatic pushes (China/Russia likely to keep condemning at UN level).
• If anything shifts dramatically (e.g., China naval moves near Hormuz or explicit NATO warnings about broader involvement), it would likely come via official statements from Beijing, Brussels, or Washington. Right now, it’s contained regionally.
• Broader context: US strategy under Trump prioritizes deterring China in the Indo-Pacific (not confrontation), homeland defense first, and shifting burdens to allies. NATO is reinforcing Arctic vigilance against Russia/China influence, but that’s ongoing—not new or tied to Iran.

[Wasi Wasi]

Surah Al-Imran (3:54) states✨:

🇮🇷✨“And the disbelievers planned, but Allah planned. And Allah is the best of planners”.✨🇮🇷

We need your prayers.🤲🤲🤲

[Wasi Wasi]

نوبل امن ایوارڈ کا مطالبہ کرنے والوں اور اسکی حمایت کرنے والوں پر اللّٰہ کی مار ہو۔آمین

[qwerty1122]

BREAKING 🚨

🇮🇷 A nuclear test by Iran ❓

A magnitude 4.3 earthquake has struck the Gerash region in southern Fars province at a depth of 10 km.

Some defense experts are questioning whether this tremor could be linked to a nuclear test.

If true, the implications would be global 🤯

[Mohib Ullah]

We’re now into day 4 of operations (dubbed “Epic Fury” by the US and “Roaring Lion” by Israel). No major de-escalation; strikes are intensifying, with spillover into Lebanon and Gulf states. I’ve included an analysis of military capacities, sustainability factors (like missiles), and regional impacts. Sourced from recent reports for balance—stick to verified outlets amid misinformation spikes.

Today’s Key Updates (March 3, 2026)

• Strikes and retaliation: US and Israeli forces launched fresh waves of airstrikes on Tehran, Beirut, and other Iranian sites, targeting military command centers, air defenses, and a compound linked to Iran’s leadership selection process. Israel reported seizing areas in southern Lebanon amid escalating clashes with Hezbollah. Iran retaliated with missile/drone strikes on US embassies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (leading to closures), Gulf energy sites, and Israeli targets—causing explosions in cities like Dubai, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv. US President Trump stated strikes have created a “leadership vacuum” in Iran and denied Israel forced the US hand, claiming Iran was poised to attack first. He hinted at a “big wave” of escalated strikes soon, potentially lasting 4-5 weeks or longer.
• Casualties and damage: Iranian Red Crescent reports ~787 deaths in Iran (up from ~555 yesterday), including civilians from strikes on government buildings and cultural sites. US: 6 service members killed (up from 4), plus injuries; 3 F-15 jets downed in friendly fire. Israel: ~11 killed, with strikes damaging infrastructure. Broader: Deaths reported in UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain; UNESCO site Golestan Palace damaged.
• Diplomatic moves: Trump rejected talks as “too late,” while US Secretary of State Rubio warned of “harder hits.” Iran rejects negotiations, vowing defiance; a temporary leadership council is forming. US closed embassies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and reduced presence in Jordan, Bahrain, Iraq, Qatar, UAE—urging Americans to leave. UK PM Starmer criticized; Trump “cut off” trade with Spain over non-support.
• Economic fallout: Oil prices surged ~7-10% (Brent ~$79/barrel) due to Strait of Hormuz disruptions (Iran effectively closed it). Global stocks down 1-2.5%; gold up 1.5%. Airspace closures stranded thousands; Dubai/Abu Dhabi airports damaged.
• Other: Funerals began for ~168 Iranian schoolgirls killed in initial strikes; public anger rising. No IAEA confirmation of nuclear site hits, but Iran claims one was targeted. X buzz: Reports of Israeli boots on ground in Iran, Kurdish talks for territory.

Fighting Capacity Analysis: Iran, Israel, USA

Based on 2026 assessments (e.g., Global Firepower, IISS, ISW), here’s a high-level comparison. The US-Israel alliance holds overwhelming air/tech superiority, but Iran excels in asymmetric warfare (proxies, drones). Prolonging favors attrition risks for all.

Aspect	Iran	Israel	USA
Overall Military Strength	Ranked ~14th globally; ~610k active personnel, focus on asymmetric tactics (IRGC proxies in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon). Degraded by prior 2025 war.	Ranked ~18th; ~170k active, elite air force (F-35s), Iron Dome defenses. High readiness, but small size limits sustained ops.	Ranked 1st; ~1.3M active, unmatched global projection (carriers, stealth bombers). Shares burdens with Israel for efficiency.
Air Power	~300 aging aircraft; air defenses heavily degraded (local superiority lost over Tehran). Relies on drones (Shaheds) for strikes.	~500 advanced jets; achieved air superiority over Tehran/Iran west. Uses stand-in munitions now.	~13k aircraft incl. B-1/B-2 bombers; deployed suicide drones, Precision Strike Missiles. Integrated with Israel for strikes.
Naval Power	~100 vessels, mostly small/fast-attack; IRGC Navy hit hard (frigates sunk). Mines/drones threaten Hormuz.	Limited (~70 vessels); focuses on sub ops, not primary in this war.	2 carrier groups in Gulf; overwhelming, but vulnerable to asymmetric threats.
Ground Forces	Strong (~350k IRGC/Army); resilient underground facilities, but command disrupted.	Elite special forces; reports of boots in Iran/Kurds. Advancing in Lebanon.	No ground invasion yet; Trump won’t rule out if needed.

US-Israel: Superior intel, precision (e.g., bunker busters), coordination—degraded ~200 Iranian air defenses. Iran: Asymmetric endurance—expand battlefield, impose costs via proxies/drones to outlast will.

Missile and Other Capacities to Continue the War

• Missiles: Iran started 2026 with ~3,000 ballistic missiles (short/medium-range), ~400 launchers, thousands of drones. Degraded: ~50% launchers destroyed (200+ hit); stocks down to ~1,200-1,500 short-range, few hundred medium-range for Israel. Running low on launchers—fewer volleys possible. Israel: Ample precision munitions, but interceptors (Arrow 3) could deplete in weeks if barrages continue. US: Strong stocks (e.g., Tomahawks, GBU-31s), but interceptors (THAAD, SM-3) strained; could run low in 10+ days if sustained. Bunker busters limited.
• Sustainability: Iran: Can endure asymmetrically (proxies like Hezbollah/Houthis), but air/naval losses limit retaliation; regime survival mode—escalate to force talks. Israel/US: Planned for 2-4 weeks; risks munitions drain, casualties if prolonged. No endless war goal—focus on degrading missiles/nuclear/navy. Economic strain: Oil disruptions hit Iran hardest.

Effects on Other Regions

• Gulf/Middle East: 8+ countries hit (Bahrain, UAE, Saudi, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Iraq); airports/ports damaged, airspace closed—stranding passengers, disrupting trade. Energy sites targeted; Hormuz closure risks 20% global oil loss. Proxies: Hezbollah active in Lebanon (Israel advancing south); Houthis may resume Red Sea attacks; Iraqi militias threaten Jordan/Saudi. Civilian hits (e.g., Bahrain apartments) fuel anger—GCC condemns Iran, but frustrated with US/Israel dragging them in.
• Europe/Asia: Oil surge hits economies; EU stocks down. Turkey views as Israeli primacy threat; China/Russia condemn strikes, urge de-escalation—no military moves yet. Broader: Refugee risks, nuclear concerns (IAEA monitoring); global markets volatile.
• Pakistan/South Asia: No direct hits, but oil hikes (~10% today) could inflate energy costs in Lahore. Cyber threats up—monitor PTA alerts. Indirect: If escalates, supply chains disrupted.

For Lahore: Fuel prices may rise soon—stock essentials if needed. Limit news to avoid stress; Al Jazeera/BBC for balance. What angle next? Stay safe!

[Hina Khan 0]

Background on Hezbollah

Hezbollah, founded in 1982 during Lebanon’s civil war, is a Shiite militant group and political party backed by Iran. It’s part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”—a network of proxies including Hamas, Houthis, and Iraqi militias—aimed at countering US and Israeli influence. Ideologically tied to Iran’s Supreme Leader (via Velayat-e Faqih), Hezbollah receives funding, training, and weapons from Tehran, including advanced drones and missiles. Historically, it’s fought Israel in conflicts like 2006 and supported Iran in regional ops (e.g., Syria). However, Israel’s 2024 campaign decimated Hezbollah: killing leaders like Hassan Nasrallah, destroying infrastructure, and reducing forces by thousands. A fragile US-brokered ceasefire in late 2024 held until now.

Current Role in the Conflict

Hezbollah entered the war on March 2, 2026—three days after US-Israeli strikes began and Khamenei’s killing was confirmed—citing it as a “red line” crossed. This marks a shift from their restraint in the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, where they vowed support but didn’t act unilaterally. Actions so far:

• Launched missiles and “swarms” of drones at Israeli military sites near Haifa and northern areas (e.g., Kfar Yuval), but most were intercepted or landed in open spaces—no major damage or casualties reported.
• By March 3 evening, ~24 attack incidents (rockets, UAVs) documented, up from 10 on day one.
• Symbolic intent: Demonstrate solidarity with Iran without full commitment, avenging Khamenei while protecting political standing in Lebanon.

Israel responded aggressively: Airstrikes on ~70 Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon (weapons depots, launchers), Beirut, and Bekaa Valley, killing ~31 (including Hezbollah’s intelligence head) and wounding 149. IDF also hit Hezbollah’s financial arm (Al Qard al Hassan branches) to cut funding. Ground advances: Israel seized southern Lebanese territory, signaling intent to “eliminate” the threat.

Hezbollah’s role is as Iran’s “reluctant proxy”: Acting to support Tehran but limited by weakness, avoiding all-out war that could “finish it off.” Unlike past escalations, they’re not leading; instead, reacting to regime threats in Iran.

Military Capacities and Sustainability

Hezbollah is a shadow of its former self post-2024, shifting from large-scale ops to asymmetric, low-cost tactics. Here’s a breakdown:

Aspect	Current Capacity	Sustainability Factors
Manpower	~20,000-30,000 fighters (down from ~100,000 pre-2024); leadership depleted (e.g., Nasrallah killed in 2024).	High attrition risk; reliant on Shiite support in Lebanon, but domestic backlash growing. Could sustain guerrilla ops for months, but not invasion-scale.
Weapons/Missiles	~50,000-100,000 rockets/drones (degraded from 150,000); long-range options moved north of Litani River. Advanced Iranian-supplied UAVs, anti-tank missiles.	Stocks could last weeks in limited barrages; Israeli strikes targeting depots/launchers reduce resupply. Iranian funding dwindling amid Tehran’s chaos.
Strategy	Asymmetric: Hit-and-run from central/northern Lebanon; avoid 2006-style ground fights.	War of attrition to impose costs on Israel/US, but vulnerable to air superiority; limited to 10-20 daily incidents so far.
Defenses	Underground networks hit hard; no equivalent to Iron Dome.	Exposed to Israeli ops; Lebanese Army disarmament efforts could further weaken (gov’t banned military activities March 2).

Overall, Hezbollah can harass but not decisively alter the conflict. Sustainability: 2-4 weeks at current pace before severe degradation; relies on Iranian survival for long-term aid.

Strategic Motivations

• Loyalty to Iran: Deep ties mean they act when regime collapse looms (e.g., Khamenei’s death). But pragmatic: Weighed domestic risks (Lebanon’s fragility) vs. duty.
• Political Survival: Attacks maintain relevance among supporters; inaction could erode standing. Lebanese PM condemned them as “irresponsible,” ordering arrests/disarmament.
• Escalation Calculus: Limited strikes signal to Israel/US without inviting full invasion; could combine with other proxies (e.g., Houthis resuming Red Sea attacks).

Broader Regional Effects

• Lebanon: Dragged into war despite gov’t efforts to avoid; ~31 deaths today, infrastructure damage. Risks civil unrest, refugee flows; UN calls for restraint.
• Middle East: Opens second front, straining Israel (diverting resources from Iran). Could spur other proxies (Iraqi militias, Houthis); weakens Iran’s axis overall (Hamas/Hezbollah decimated, Assad fallen).
• Global/WW3 Risks: Adds to escalation fears; no major Russia/China involvement yet, but proxy wars could broaden.
• Pakistan/South Asia: Indirect—oil disruptions (Hormuz/Red Sea threats) could spike Lahore fuel prices; cyber risks if proxies target allies. No direct Hezbollah links, but regional instability affects trade/remittances.

Hezbollah’s role is pivotal but diminished: A proxy testing limits in Iran’s defense, potentially prolonging the war through attrition. Watch for: Bigger Hezbollah salvos, Israeli ground ops in Lebanon, or proxy coordination. If Iran stabilizes, Hezbollah might de-escalate. Thoughts on this, or another angle? Stay safe in Lahore—monitor local energy updates.

[Night Rafique]

US-Israel-Iran conflict now in its fifth day (as of late March 3, 2026, ~11 PM PKT), the Houthis (Ansar Allah) in Yemen remain a major wildcard in the broader regional escalation. As an Iran-backed proxy in the “Axis of Resistance,” their primary leverage is control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern Red Sea entrance—chokepoint for ~10-12% of global trade and much of Europe’s oil/imports via Suez.

Here’s a focused analysis of their role in the Red Sea amid the current war, based on the latest reports.

Current Status (as of March 3, 2026 Evening)

• No confirmed attacks yet: Despite threats, the Houthis have not launched any verified missile, drone, or boarding attacks on commercial or military shipping in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden since the US-Israeli strikes began on Feb 28. This follows a relative calm period from mid-November 2025 (after a Gaza-linked ceasefire) through late February 2026—no sustained incidents reported in that window.
• Strong threats and signaling:
  • On Feb 28 (day 1 of strikes), anonymous senior Houthi officials told media (e.g., AP) they plan to resume attacks on Israel-linked/affiliated shipping and potentially direct strikes on Israel.
  • Houthi spokespeople called Iranian actions “legitimate” and reiterated solidarity, with mass rallies in Sanaa condemning the strikes.
  • Leadership (e.g., Abdulmalik al-Houthi) has mobilized supporters but avoided explicit military commitments so far.
• Industry response: Major carriers (Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, CMA CGM) have halted or paused Red Sea/Suez transits, rerouting via Cape of Good Hope. Shipping advisories (UKMTO, BIMCO, US MARAD) warn of elevated risks, with insurance spiking and some lines shelving 2026 Suez return plans entirely.
• Why the delay? Analysts note internal splits (hardliners push action; pragmatists weigh risks), Iran’s public stance against proxy help (“We defend ourselves”), and Houthis’ caution after past US/UK strikes depleted capabilities. They’re positioned for quick escalation but holding for now—possibly waiting for clearer Iranian collapse signals or to avoid provoking direct Yemen campaign.

Houthis’ Historical & Potential Role in Red Sea

The Houthis have proven highly disruptive in maritime domains since late 2023:

• Past campaign (2023-2025): Launched hundreds of missiles/drones at commercial vessels (often misidentified as Israeli-linked), US warships, and Israel. Sank ships, seized others, imposed de facto blockade around Bab al-Mandab—causing massive rerouting, insurance surges, and global supply chain chaos.
• Capabilities: Iranian-supplied drones (Shahed variants), anti-ship ballistic/cruise missiles, explosive USVs/UUVs, small-boat swarms. Redeployed assets along Red Sea coast pre-war (Hodeida, Hajjah). Can reach far (e.g., past attacks on Israel, potential Horn of Africa targets like UAE/Israeli positions in Somaliland).
• Strategy if they escalate: Likely “controlled” approach—target US/Israeli-affiliated ships first, then broaden to impose costs without full war. Could coordinate with IRGC (e.g., satellite intel from spy ships like ex-Behshad). Goal: Raise economic pain on West/Gulf, force de-escalation talks, boost domestic support.

Aspect	Houthis’ Strengths	Limitations & Risks	Sustainability in Current War
Maritime Disruption	Control Bab al-Mandab; proven asymmetric tactics (drones cheap, hard to stop fully)	Degraded by 2024-2025 US/UK strikes; limited precision for distant targets	High short-term (weeks-months); could disrupt 10-20% global trade if resumed
Missile/Drone Arsenal	Thousands of Iranian-supplied systems; redeployed pre-war	Stocks finite; vulnerable to preemptive strikes	Medium—can sustain barrages but risk rapid depletion if US/Israel target Yemen
Political Leverage	Boosts “resistance” cred; rallies in Yemen	Domestic war-weariness; potential backlash if escalates famine/humanitarian crisis	Medium—solidarity helps regime survival but risks isolation
Coordination with Iran	Direct IRGC support/training	Iran publicly downplays proxy role; Houthis autonomous	Variable—could act independently if Iran weakens further

Broader Implications & What to Watch

• If Houthis resume: Dual chokepoint crisis (Hormuz + Bab al-Mandab) would spike oil/freight costs globally, delay Suez returns indefinitely, hit Europe/Asia hardest. Could target Horn of Africa (e.g., UAE bases) or expand to Indian Ocean.
• Regional effects: Strains Gulf states (already hit by Iranian missiles); diverts US/coalition resources from Iran focus. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis worsens if strikes return.
• For Pakistan/Lahore: Indirect but real—higher oil prices (already surging) inflate fuel/food costs; potential supply chain delays for imports via sea. No direct threat, but monitor energy news and cyber risks from regional spillover.
• Next 24-72 hours critical: Analysts say decision point soon—watch for Houthi military media announcements, demos turning operational, or first confirmed drone/missile launch. If none by mid-week, restraint might hold longer.

Houthis’ Red Sea role is asymmetric high-impact: Not decisive for Iran’s survival, but perfect for imposing global economic pain and showing Axis solidarity without full commitment yet. If they jump in, it turns regional war into maritime/global trade crisis fast.

Thoughts on this, or want details on another proxy (e.g., Iraqi militias)? Stay safe—keep an eye on fuel prices locally.

[Jannatul Ferdus]

US-Israel-Iran conflict enters its fifth day (late March 3, 2026, ~11 PM PKT), Iraqi Shia militias (mostly Iran-backed groups within or linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces - PMF/Hashd al-Shaabi) have emerged as a significant secondary front. They’re acting as part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” to retaliate against US/Israeli strikes, but their involvement is asymmetric—mostly low-to-medium intensity drone/rocket attacks on US-linked targets in Iraq and threats to expand regionally. This draws Iraq deeper into the conflict, risking domestic instability and US preemptive responses.

Background on Iraqi Militias

The PMF is an official Iraqi state security umbrella (integrated since 2016) with ~150,000-200,000 fighters, but many factions remain loyal to Iran over Baghdad. Key Iran-aligned groups include:

• Kataib Hezbollah (US-designated terrorist group): Hardline, ideologically closest to IRGC; focuses on anti-US ops.
• Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba: Similar hardline stance; involved in Syria/Iraq fights.
• Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH): Politically influential (part of Shia Coordination Framework); more restrained due to parliamentary/government roles.
• Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and others: Smaller but active in claims.
• Front/coalition names: Islamic Resistance in Iraq (umbrella for claims); Saraya Awliya al-Dam (often a cover for larger groups).

These militias have historically targeted US forces (e.g., 2020-2024 attacks) to push withdrawal. US troops largely left federal Iraq in Jan 2026 but remain in Kurdistan (e.g., Erbil airport/base, Harir).

Current Role in the Conflict (as of March 3, 2026)

They joined quickly after Feb 28 strikes/Khamenei’s death:

• Attacks claimed/launched:
  • Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed 28+ attacks (March 2) with dozens of drones/missiles on “enemy bases” in Iraq/region (videos show launches; no confirmed major successes/interceptions noted).
  • Saraya Awliya al-Dam: Claimed drone “swarm” on former US Victory Base/Baghdad Airport (March 1-2; one drone crashed into Iraqi Special Ops HQ; another intercepted).
  • Drone strikes on US-linked sites in Erbil (Kurdistan; March 1-2), causing power outages at key gas fields.
  • Ballistic missile claims by Kataib Hezbollah/Harakat al-Nujaba on US bases in Iraqi Kurdistan/Kuwait (March 2; unverified impacts).
• Threats to expand: Kataib Hezbollah condemned UAE/Saudi for supporting “Zionist-American project” and claimed US jets/drones operate from Jordan—threatening attacks there. Some unverified claims of strikes on Saudi Aramco.
• US/Israeli countermeasures: Preemptive airstrikes (Feb 28-March 2) hit PMF/Kataib Hezbollah sites in Jurf al-Sakhr (south Baghdad), Diyala, al-Qaim, Samawah, Ninewa Plains, Mosul checkpoint. Casualties: 4-8+ killed, several wounded (e.g., 4 in one Jurf strike; 2 in another).

Iraqi gov’t (PM Sudani) condemned attacks undermining stability, blocked Green Zone access, deployed riot police vs. militia protests. Some militias (e.g., AAH-linked) show restraint to protect political gains.

Military Capacities and Sustainability

These groups excel in asymmetric warfare but face limits:

Aspect	Key Strengths	Limitations & Risks	Sustainability in Current War
Manpower	Tens of thousands (PMF total ~150k+); recruitment surges (e.g., Diyala pledges).	Ideological splits; some prioritize Iraq politics over Iran loyalty.	Medium—can sustain low-level ops months; high attrition if US escalates strikes.
Weapons	Iranian-supplied drones (Shahed-like), short/medium-range missiles, rockets; years of stockpiling.	Degraded by preemptive strikes; limited precision/success against defended US sites.	Medium—drones cheap/effective for harassment; missiles risk rapid depletion.
Strategy	Hit-and-run on US/Kurdish targets; claim via coalitions to avoid direct blame.	Exposed to airstrikes; Iraqi gov’t pressure to disarm/restrain.	High short-term (weeks); could prolong via attrition but risks isolating Iraq.
Coordination	IRGC support; pre-war planning meetings reported.	Not fully unified—some (AAH) more cautious.	Variable—strong vs. US; weaker if Iran collapses further.

Overall: Not game-changers for Iran (unlike Hezbollah’s past scale), but effective for imposing costs on US presence, diverting resources, and showing solidarity. Low success rate so far (many intercepted/failed), but persistent harassment could strain US defenses.

Broader Implications

• Iraq as parallel theater: Widens war without direct Iran involvement; risks sectarian tensions, protests, or gov’t collapse if militias push too hard.
• US posture: Preemptive strikes degrade capabilities; Trump vows more if needed. Remaining US forces in Kurdistan vulnerable.
• Regional spillover: Threats to Jordan/Kuwait/Saudi could pull Gulf deeper; echoes 2024 Jordan outpost attack (3 US killed).
• For Pakistan/Lahore: Indirect—higher oil volatility from regional instability; potential remittance/trade hits if Iraq destabilizes. No direct links, but monitor energy prices and cyber threats.

Iraqi militias’ role is classic proxy: Retaliate asymmetrically to bleed US will, avenge Khamenei, and deter full regime change in Iran—while Baghdad tries to contain fallout. If Iran weakens more, expect intensified militia ops or restraint if Baghdad pressures hard. Watch for: More claims tonight/tomorrow, US responses in Kurdistan, or Jordan threats materializing.

Thoughts, or want focus on a specific group like Kataib Hezbollah? Stay safe—Lahore fuel might tick up again soon.